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One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins
the Berne Convention
by

JANE

C.

GINSBURG* AND JOHN

M.

KERNOCHAN**

INTRODUCTION

In historic votes on October 5 and October 12, the U.S. Senate
and House of Representatives unanimously approved legislation
designed to bring U.S. law into compliance with the Berne Convention.1 The legislation was signed by President Reagan on October 31,
1988. Also signed by the President was a Senate Resolution of October 20 of Ratification of the Berne Convention. Following deposit of
the requisite instruments with the World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, U.S. adherence to Berne took effect on March
1, 1989.
For the U.S., this momentous step is the culmination of decades of
struggle, including many failed attempts by the U.S. over the years to
align itself with other developed and developing nations in subscribing to the world's oldest and most extensive treaty protecting the
rights of authors. The step was at last achieved in the closing hours
of the hectic session of the Congress shortly before the Presidential
election. It was achieved, also, in the face of internal political maneuvering that threatened the adherence bills with delay and possible defeat until the last moment.
U.S. Efforts to Join Berne

U.S. ratification came one hundred and two years after the United
States' official observer at the initial international conference from
which the Convention emerged recommended U.S. participation in
the Berne Union. At that time, the U.S. had no international copyright relations. We were, and had long been, a "pirate nation" for
whom protection abroad offered fewer attractions than free copying
~ Assooiate Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
** Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
Copyright © 1989, Jane C. Ginsburg and John M. Kernochan. All rights reserved.
I. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of I 988, Pub. L. No. I 00-568, I 02 Stat.
2853 ( 1988) [herinafter Berne Implementation Act].
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at home of foreign, particularly British, works. 2 There was no general provision protecting foreign works until the Chace Act of 1891. 8
Over the intervening century, the U.S. politics of intellectual property changed. From a user and importer of copyrighted works, the
U.S. became a producer and leading exporter. The appeal of international protection became correspondingly manifest. There followed a
proliferation of bilateral copyright agreements,' but, until the 1950s,
no participation in a major multilateral copyright convention:1
When the U.S. finally joined a major international convention in
1955, it was not the Berne Convention. At that time, U.S. law fell
below many of the substantive minima of protection imposed by the
Berne Convention. For example, Berne sets forth a minimum duration of copyright of fifty years, 6 but U.S. copyright protection endured for only 28 years, unless the proprietor renewed the registration for a second 28-year term. 7 Berne prohibits imposition of
formalities conditioning the enjoyment or exercise of copyright, 8 but
U.S. law at the time required a notice of copyright on published copies and omission of the notice resulted in loss of protection. 9 Moreover, U.S. law required registration and deposit of works as a prerequisite to a suit for copyright infringement. 10 Beginning in 1928,
Berne provided for the author's "moral rights" to claim attribution
for his work, and to prevent its alteration or mutilation, 11 but the
U.S. did not recognize such rights. Rather than amend its law to resolve these and other differences to permit Berne adherence, the
U.S. actively promoted the creation of the Universal Copyright Con2. See, e.g., Sandison, Tiu Berne Convention and tlu Universal Copyright Convention: Tiu American Experience, 11 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 89 (1986); Ringer, Tiu Role of tlu United States in
International Copyright-Past, Present and. Future, 56 Gro. L.J. 1050 (1968).
3. Act of March 3, 1891, § 13, 22 Stat. 1106.
4. See 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Appendix 20 (1988), listing countries with
which the U.S. has copyright relations, including bilateral arrangements, and the dates of
entry into these agreements.
5. Except for the 1910 Buenos Aires Convention, 38 Stat. 1785, T.S. 593 (1911). This
treaty provides for copyright relations between the U.S. and most North, Central, and South
American nations.
6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, art. 7 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
7. I 7 U.S.C.§ 24 (1909), superseded by 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976) (term of life of author plus
50 years for works created as of I 978).
8. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art 5.2.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19 (1909). Under the 1976 Act,§§ 401 and 405, notice was still
required, but the copyright owner benefited from a five-year period in which to cure omissions of notice.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1909). See also 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976).
11. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis.
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vention (UCC), 12 a new international copyright treaty largely tailored
to the peculiarities of U.S. law.
By the late 1980s, however, many U.S. officials and copyright proprietors perceived that remaining outside the Berne Union was at the
least inconvenient, and moreover was proving increasingly embarrassing and even detrimental to U.S. copyright interests. Nonmembership was inconvenient because many U.S. copyright industries
found the commonly used indirect method of achieving Berne protection costly and onerous. This method involved manipulating the
work's country of origin by effecting "simultaneous" publication in a
Berne country (usually Canada), thus obtaining "back door" Berne
protection. 18 It was also possible to achieve Berne-level protection in
those UCC countries also signatory to the Berne Convention which
had merged Berne standards with their domestic law, for the rule of
national treatment (according UCC authors the same treatment as
nationals) would accord U.S. copyright owners protection coextensive
with Berne minima. However, U.S. resort to the UCC and to the
"back door" to achieve Berne-level protection without assuming
Berne's responsibilities produced considerable resentment, and even
threats of retaliation. 14 Moreover, despite occasionally benefiting
from Berne, the U.S. had no role in the evolution and management
of this premier international pact. In an era of rapid technological
change and doctrinal development, the U.S. continued to stand on
the outside looking in. 111
Nonmembership in the Berne Convention was embarrassing not
only because the U.S. was the only non-Unionist Western country,
but also because nonmembership offered one ground of resistance to
U.S. trade negotiators seeking to encourage greater respect for U.S.
copyrights abroad. If the U.S. so strongly advocated a high level of
12. Provisions of the UCC particularly compatible with U.S. law under the 1909 Act include art. III (formalities) and art. IV (duration). The Universal Copyright Convention, July
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868.
13. Berne Convention, supra note 6, arts. 5.4b (work will be considered of Berne origin if it
is published simultaneously in a non-Berne country and in a Berne country); 3.4 ("simultaneous" publication must occur within 30 days of actual first publication).
14. The capacity for retaliation was illustrated when various EEC Berne members proposed in 1986 to embargo millions of dollars worth of U.S. products unless the Copyright
Act's manufacturing clause was eliminated. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE BERNE
CONVENTION, WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD JOIN THE BERNE CONVENTION 3 (1987). See also
Ringer, supra note 2, at 1059.
15. See 133 CoNG. REC. S7369 (daily ed. May 29, 1987) (statement by Sen. Leahy): " ...
today, and in future years, vital American interests can be fully represented in the international copyright system only if we get off the sidelines and onto the playing field, by joining
the Berne Convention."
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copyright protection and enforcement by its trading partners, why
was the U.S. not a member of the most protective multilateral copyright treaty?16 Other political considerations also enhanced the attractions of Berne adherence: not only was the UCC less protective
than Berne, it was administered by UNESCO, an international
agency from which the U.S. had recently withdrawn its support.
Moreover, adherence would secure copyright relations with twentyfour additional nations, and would bolster U.S. endeavors to include
intellectual property in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 17
The latest, and finally successful, U.S. effort to join Berne can be
traced to the initiative of the State Department. The Department
convened an Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention 18 to report on the changes in U.S. law required
for adherence. The Group's Final Report 19 restricted itself to identifying particular features of U.S. law currently required to be changed
to achieve compatibility with Berne. It thus focused on U.S. laws as
they affected works of foreign origin subject to Berne protection,
since Berne "does not require that a member country grant the protections required by the Convention's text to works of which that
country is 'the country of origin'." 20 In 14 chapters addressed to different aspects of authors' rights, the Working Group determined that
particular questioned aspects of U.S. law were substantially legally
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988); S. REP. No. 352, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1988).
17. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary (Feb. 18, 1988) (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, United States
Trade Representative) (available from the Proprietary Rights Comm., Information Industry
Ass'n in Washington, D.C.).
18. The Working Group membership included: Irwin Karp, Chairman [Authors League
of America]; Norman Alterman [Motion Picture Export Ass'n of America, Inc.]; Jon A.
Baumgarten [Ass'n of American Publishers]; Leonard Feist (National Music Publishers Ass'n,
Inc.]; Morton David Goldberg [Information Industry Ass'n]; Bella Linden (The Songwriters
Guild]; I. Fred Koenigsberg [American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers]; William
Maxwell [Computer & Business Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n]; Gary Roth (Broadcast Music, Inc.]; Hamish R. Sandison [Recording Industry Ass'n of America]; Augustus W.
Steinhilber [National School Boards Ass'n]; Robert Wedgeworth [American Library Ass'n];
and ex officio, Harvey J. Winter (serving as Executive Secretary) (Department of State]; Donald C. Curran (Former Acting Register of Copyrights]; Lewis Flacks [Copyright Office];
Michael S. Keplinger [Office of Legislation and International Affairs, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office]. Note that the Group members served as individuals; the names of various organizations they represent or are affiliated with are given solely for identification and do not
imply endorsement by those organizations of the Final Report.
19. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
10 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513 (1986) (hereinafter Final Report].
20. Id. at 516.
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compatible with Berne, including: certain compulsory licenses; 21 existing exemptions to rights of performance and display; 22 and copy_right ownership, especially works for hire. 28 The Working Group
also judged that U.S. law as a whole afforded adequate equivalents to
moral rights. However, the Group found that the following areas of
U.S. copyright law were substantially incompatible with Berne standards: the jukebox compulsory license; 2 • domestic manufacturing requirements;211 many aspects of the formalities of notice, registration
and recordation; 28 certain aspects of duration; 27 and (in a lesser degree) retroactivity, and certain exclusions from the subject matter of
copyright. Finally, the Working Group concluded that the Berne
Convention, as applied to the U.S., was not necessarily self-executing-the provisions of the Convention if ratified need not apply of
their own force, but could be made to be effective in the U.S. solely
via specific domestic legislation.
Following the Ad Hoc Working Group's Report, legislative proposals were introduced to secure Berne aqherence. 28 In the hearings and
discussions on bills to adhere to Berne, attention centered on:
whether or not the Berne Convention was self-executing; moral
rights and works for hire; formalities; 'jukebox licensing; and inclusion of architecture within the subject matter of copyright. The first
three subjects were the most intensely debated.
.
The approach common to virtually all the legislation proposed, and
governing. the omissions from it, was the "minimalist approach" supported by a preponderance of the interests favoring Berne adherence. 29 In recognition of the ease with which even minority opposing
21. These licenses involve cable, sound recordings, and public broadcasting, 17 U .S.C. § §
l l l, I 15, 118.
22. Id. §§ 109, I IO.
23. Id. §§ IOI, 20l(b).
24. Id. § 116.
25. Id. § 601. This became a non-issue because of expiration and non-renewal of the
"manufacturing clause."
26. Id. §§ 40 l-12; 205(d).
27. Id. § 304(a).
28. In the 99th Congress, a bill drafted by the Copyright Office was proposed and discussed, see Hearings on S. 1980 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Chairman, Senator Charles C.
Mathias, Jr.). Bills introduced in the 100th Congress included:
S. 1303 (Leahy), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
S. 197 I (Hatch), I 00th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
H.R. 1623 (Kastenmeier), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
H.R. 2962 (Moorhead-Administration bill), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
H.R. 4262 (Kastenmeier), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
29. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 16 at 20 ("Philosophy of the [Berne Imple-
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interests can block legislation from passage through the intricate
Congressional processes, this approach called for making only those
changes in existing U.S. law essential to achieve a plausible level of
Berne compatibility. In retrospect, and considering how close the
whole effort came to being derailed in its closing stages, it would
seem the proponents of this approach were right. The price paid was
arguably a less than full embracing of the "Spirit of Berne" in its
broadest sense. But adherence, the principal goal, was in fact attained. New battles to move U.S. law further toward a fuller acceptance of Berne's wider implications will certainly be fought in the
future.
,....Under the compromises hammered out in the legislative arena, it
was early decided that the Berne Convention would not be "self-executing" in the United States. The U.S. Berne Adherence legislation
enacted by Congress therefore purports to be the sole source of
Berne rights and rules under U.S. law to which claimants may appeal,
except when conflict of laws rules otherwise direct -and except when,
as we will see hereafter, substitutes or "rough equivalents" to Berne
provisions may be found in U.S. copyright legislation or in other federal or state statutes, decisions or regulations that now exist or may
later be developed. 30 This very guarded stance, a key element in the
minimalist approach, was essential to U.S. adoption of Berne. 31
Finally, it is worth observing that the support of major U.S. commercial interests, particularly in the computer field, the film industry,
and certain portions of the publishing industry, was essential to secure adherence to the Berne Convention. 32 In many Congresses
before the 100th, bills urging ratification of the Berne Convention
had been proposed. 33 Yet until now, no Berne adherence attempt
menting] Legislation"); 133 CONG. REC. S 14552 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Senator
Leahy upon Senate passage of the Berne legislation).
30. See Berne Implementation Act,§§ 2, 3, 4, 6, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
31. Certain of the other incompatibility problems raised by the Ad Hoc Working Group
were largely brushed aside as non-essential, such as renewal and duration, and problems of
retroactivity. The manufacturing clause became moot. Initial proposals for protecting architecture fell by the wayside. But see infra notes 89-99, and accompanying text. Defining "Berne
Works" proved complex, but was generally managed without serious controversy. See infra
note 52.
32. Some artists and arts groups played a minor role in the adherence struggle. Unfortunately, to the extent that they adopted a purist stance, refusing to recognize political realities
and the impossibility of going beyond the minimalist position if adherence was to be
achieved, their participation also sometimes proved obstructive.
33. See Ringer, supra note 2, at 1058, and sources cited therein, especially, GOLDMAN, THE
HISTORY OF USA COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Studies Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,

1988)

U.S.

JOINS BERNE CONVENTION

7

had even approached a likelihood of passage. What made the difference this time may well have been the efforts of the majority of U.S.
copyright industries. 84 Why they in turn pushed for Berne adherence
pursuant to S. Res. 53) Study No.I, at 4 (1960).
34. Many members of these industries formed groups to lobby in favor of Berne adherence. The two principal groups were the National Committee for the Berne Convention
(NCBC), and the Committee for Adherence to Berne (CAB).
NCBC members were:
ADAPSO (The Computer Software and Services Industry Ass'n); American
Ass'n of School Administrators; American Ass'n of University Professors; American Council on Education; American Library Ass'n; ASCAP (American Society of
Composers, Authors & Publishers); Applied Data Research, Inc.; AAUP (Ass'n of
American University Presses); Ass'n of Research Libraries; Autodesk, Inc.; Baltimore County Schools; BMI (Broadcast Music Inc.); CBEMA (Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n); Comshare, Inc.; Council for American Private Education; The Data Group Corp.; Deneb Systems, Inc.; The Walt Disney Co.;
Distribution Management Systems Corp.; Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc.;
Gancom, Inc.; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.; l.M.R.S., Inc.; Integral Business
Systems; IBM (lnt'l Business Machines Corporation); IIA (Information Industry
Ass'n); Int'l Reading Ass'n; Johns Hopkins University; Management Science
America, Inc. (MSA); Music Education Nat'l Conference; Nat'l Clearinghouse for
Bilingual Education; Nat'l Commission on Libraries and Information Science;
NMPA (Nat'l Music Publishers Ass'n); NSBA (Nat'l School Boards Ass'n); SESAC
Inc., Supply Tech, Inc.; TLB, Inc.; Unitech Software, Inc.; U.S. Catholic Conference; United States Council for Int') Business; Vanguard Atlantic Ltd.; Viewplan,
Inc.; VM Personal Computing, Inc.; WOS Data Systems, Inc.; John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. Publishers; Ashton-Tate Corp.; Harris Publishing Co.; Hudson Hills Press,
Inc.; IPL (Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.); Lotus Development Corp.; MPAA
(Motion Picture Ass'n of America); Music Publishers Ass'n of the United States;
Peter Norton Computing Members; Intellectual Property Committee.
CAB members were:
ADAPSO; American Electronics Ass'n; American Film Marketing Ass'n; Ass'n of
American Exporters and Importers; AT&T; BMG Music (Formerly RCA-Ariola,
Int')); California Council for Int') Trade; Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n; Consumers for a Sound Economy; Digital Equipment Corporation;
Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc.; Gulf & Western (Simon & Schuster, Paramount Pictures); Hewlett-Packard Co.; Hasbro Toy Co.; Hudson Hill Press; IBM
Corp.; Information Industries Ass'n; Intellectual Property Committee; Intellectual
Property Owners; John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Lotus Software; Motion Picture Ass'n
of America; Nat'I Ass'n of Manufacturers; Training Media Distributor Ass'n; Texas
Instruments Inc.; Walt Disney Studios.
Members of other intellectual property industries also urged Berne adherence. The following
entities formed the Intellectual Property Committee:
Bristol-Myers Co.; E.l. du Pont de Nemours and Co.; FMC Corp.; General Electric Co.; General Motors Corp.; Hewlett-Packard Co.; IBM Corp.; Johnson & Johnson; Merck & Co., Inc.; Monsanto Co.; Pfizer Inc.; and Rockwell Int'I.
See S. REP. No. 352, supra note 16, at 7-8.
Certain portions of the publishing industry, however, displayed considerably less enthusiasm for the Berne Convention. Several magazine publishers formed the "Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright Tradition," principally to prevent Berne adherence from becoming a means toward the recognition and fostering of moral rights in the U.S. Members of
this lobbying group were:
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most likely stems from the increased recognition of the importance
of international consumption, and therefore of international protection, of U.S. copyrighted works. 311
The ensuing discussion examines two broad questions concerning
the legislation leading to Berne adherence: first, what features of
U.S. copyright law have changed in light of Berne adherence; second in those areas of copyright law which Congress failed to change,
how does the U.S. law compare with treaty standards?
I.

Changes in U.S. Domestic Copyright Law

There are two principal areas in which the new legislation has
modified the 1976 Copyright Act: the compulsory license for jukebox performances of nondramatic music, and most importantly,
formalities.
A. jukebox Licensing
Of the four compulsory licenses in the U.S. Copyright Act that
took effect in 1978, only one was determined to be incompatible with
Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention-the Jukebox License. Compulsory licenses were found to be permitted for cable television
under Article l lbis (2), and for mechanical recordings under Article
13(1). As to public broadcasting, the Ad Hoc Committee had found it
arguable that Article 11 bis (2) and Article 9(2) permitted this limited
type of compulsory licensing.
By contrast, the Jukebox Licensing provisions could not stand m
the face of Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention, which states:
Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works shall enjoy
the exclusive right of authorizing:
Conde Nast Publications, Inc.; Davis Publications, Inc.; Dow Jones & Co., Inc.;
Forbes Inc.; McGraw-Hill, Inc.; Meredith Corp.; Newsweek, Inc.; Omni Publications lnt'I, Ltd.; Playboy Enterprises Inc.; The Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.; Rodale
Press, Inc.; Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc.; Time Inc.; Triangle Publications, Inc.;
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.; U.S. News & World Report.
The Magazine Publishers Association also opposed Berne adherence.
35. See, e.g., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM., FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (Investigation No. 332-245
under Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930) (February 1988); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP·
ERTY RIGHTS, GAO/NSIAD-87-65 (April 1987); Oversight on International Copyrights, 1984:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. I 5 (I 984) (report submitted by David Ladd, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office: To Secure Intellectual Property Rights in World Commerce).
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(i) the public performance of their works, including such public performance by any means of process;
(ii) any communication to the public of the performance of their works.

Thus Congress undertook to revise the terms of § 116 of the Copyright Act. The new § 116 contemplates that the jukebox operators
and the copyright owners will negotiate a voluntary license agreement on terms and rate of royalty payments, division of fees, and
designation of agents. 88 Negotiations may be remitted to arbitration.87 Licensing arrangements successfully arrived at in this way are
"in lieu" of any compulsory determination of such arrangements by
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT). 88 Compulsory licensing
under the aegis of the CRT remains in effect until arrangements are
concluded privately and, if private licensing fails or terminates for
some reason, compulsory licensing will provide a "safety net" and
will govern, filling any licensing gap that might otherwise occur. 89
In essence Congress in the new § 116 has called for and facilitated
private licensing between the parties and relegated CRT-controlled
compulsory licensing to a back-up role. Whether this revised system
will in fact result in successful and enduring private licensing by private collectivities remains to be seen, but it is quite possible that it
will, since there is an element of coercion in the background. Of the
three major areas of change in U.S. law, this one - building on existing arrangements - was perhaps the least controversial.
B.

Formalities

I.

Notice

The most significant change in U.S. copyright law concerns the notice requirement: works published after March 1989 no longer need
include a notice of copyright (©, date, name of author or copyright
proprietor). Notice remains optional (and for reasons discussed below, advised), but a work will no longer risk falling into the public
domain through omission of notice. Moreover, notice is no longer
mandatory whatever the origin of the work, be it from the U.S.,
from other Berne countries, or from countries linked to the U.S. by
the UCC or a bilateral arrangement.
The abandonment of mandatory notice completes the 1976 Act's
36.
2853,
37.
38.
39.

The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 4, § I 16A(c)(l), 102 Stat.
2856 (1988).
Id. § 116A(c)(2), 102 Stat. at 2856.
Id. § l l 6A(d), 102 Stat. at 2856.
Id. § I 16A(g), 102 Stat. at 2856-57.
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considerable relaxation of this formal requirement. Under the 1909
Act, publication without notice could immediately prove fatal. The
1976 Act afforded the copyright proprietor a five-year grace period
in which to correct omissions of notice;' 0 but forfeiture of rights remained a threat. Achieving conformity with the Berne Convention
thus required a step from the 1976 Act shorter than from its
predecessor.
Nonetheless, a few words of caution are in order. While absence of
notice no longer will divest the work of copyright protection in the
U.S., the Berne Implementation Act provides that presence of notice
will defeat a defense of "innocent infringement. " 41 A successful defense may result in diminution of the actual or statutory damages
awarded the copyright holder. 42 To avoid this risk, the copyright
holder, whether from the U.S. or abroad, should therefore continue
to affix notice to all published copies. 43
That said, how great is the risk of encountering a successful innocent infringer defense to absence of notice? The 1988 legislation
does not explicitly define "innocent infringement." The text does refer to the 1976 Act's provision on statutory damages. This disposition permits a court to reduce the award "in a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts
constituted an infringement of copyright. " 44 Assuming this reference
sets forth the criteria for innocent infringement of a notice-less work
40. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2). However, if notice were omitted from "no more than a relatively small number of copies"; or had been omitted in violation of a written agreement to
affix notice, no forfeiture would result. Id., § 405(a)(l), (3).
41. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 7, §§ 40l(d), 402(d), 102
Stat. 2853, 2857-58 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 401,402).
42. Id.
43. Moreover, one should not forget that notice remains necessary to secure or maintain
protection in those countries which impose formalities, and which are members of the UCC,
but not of Berne. Article III of the UCC permits member countries to require a prescribed
form of notice, and to compel registration and deposit of copies prior to suit. Of the twentyfive UCC non-Berne countries, several require compliance with local formalities. These countries include: Colombia, Law No. 86 on Copyright, December 26, 1946, arts. 73, 88; Panama,
Administrative Code, part V (arts. 1889-1966) of August 22, 1916, arts. 1906, 1907, 1912,
1915; Venezuela, Law relating to Copyright of November 29 and December 12, 1962, art.
90. See also Paraguay, Law No. 94 concerning the Protection of Scientific, Literary and Artistic Works and the Establishment of the Public Register of Intellectual Rights, of July 5 and
IO, 1951, arts. 47, 58 (registration required unless foreign works complied with country of
origin formalities: this formality would therefore apply to U.S. works published before March
1989). English translations reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD.

44.

17 U .S.C. § 504(c).
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after Berne adherence, 411 the 1988 amendments would seem to set a
rather high threshold before the copyright owner's recovery becomes
seriously compromised. Indeed, the "not aware and had no reason to
believe" standard ought not to excuse most defendants engaged in
commercial exploitation of copyrighted works. Those whose business
revolves around copyrighted works should be deemed to know the
basics of the copyright law,"8 including the central tenet that works
created as of 1978 enjoy federal copyright protection from creation
and fixation." 7 This holds even more so for works created after
March 1989, where notice should no longer supply even a confirmatory afterthought. As a result, it may be difficult for most defendants
confronting a notice-less copy to meet a "not aware" test, particularly
when the test may be interpreted to require that defendant have "acted in complete ignorance of the fact that his conduct might somehow infringe upon the rights of another party.""8
One might object that this interpretation so constricts the innocent
infringer test as to remove any powerful incentive to add notice. Yet,
despite its elimination of mandatory notice, Congress did intend to
encourage its continued use. We would respond that while Congress
sought to encourage notice, that encouragement was not to assume
the form of a disguised requirement. The Senate Report asserts that
by incorporating an innocent infringer defense to absence of notice,
45. Section 405(b) of the 1976 Act contained a more explicit definition, directly applicable to omissions of notice. This provision, titled "Effect of omission [of notice] on innocent
infringers" stated:
[A]ny person who innocently infringes a copyright, in reliance upon an authorized
copy or phonorecord from which the copyright notice has been omitted, incurs no
liability for actual or statutory damages under section 504 for any infringing acts
committed before receiving actual notice that the registration for the work had
been made under section 408, if such person proves that he or she was misled by
the omission of notice.
But, these elements of innocent infringement may not be relevant in the post-Berne context, because the Implementation Act limits the applicability of § 405(b) to copies published
before the effective date of U.S. Berne adherence(§ 7(e)(2)). It seems clear that an innocent
infringer defense which resulted in "no liability for ... damages" (emphasis supplied) would
conflict with the Berne art. 5.2 requirement that enjoyment and exercise of copyright not be
subject to any formality.
46. See, e.g., Merrill v. Bill Miller's BBQ Enterprises, 688 F. Supp. II 72, II 76 (W .D. Tex.
1988) (rejecting innocent infringer defense based on erroneous claim of statutory exemption
to public performance right: "In view of the physical and financial size of defendant's restaurant chain, their prior subscription to [a background music service], and the well-developed
caselaw interpreting the statute, defendants could not form a reasonable good faith belief that
their public performances of copyrighted music were exempt") (emphasis in original).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
48. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 464
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
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the Berne Implementatiori Act was "creating a limited incentive for
notice which is compatible with Berne. "'9 The stronger the incentive to
affix notice, the greater the risk of conflict with Berne's no-formalities rule, if that incentive is the prospect of insignificant recovery
when notice is omitted. Were the actual damages awarded to noticeomitting copyright proprietors significantly reduced, it would be difficult to maintain that compliance with the notice formality 1s no
longer a condition to enjoyment and exercise of copyright.

2. Registration of Works and Deposit of Copies
Section 411 of the 1976 Act made registration of a work with the
Copyright Office and an accompanying deposit of copies a prerequisite to initiation of any infringement action. On its face, this requirement appears inconsistent with art 5.2 of the Berne Convention,
which prohibits subjecting the "enjoyment and exercise" of copy.,,
right to "any formality." Although registration does not give rise to
the right, it is a condition of its effective exercise. This was the leading view among U.S. copyright experts:10 Nonetheless, the Register
of Copyrights opposed abandonment of the pre-suit registration requirement. The Register expressed concern that deposits to the great
collections of the Library of Congress would diminish were registration completely optional. He also asserted that the registration requirement was not a "formality" in the sense proscribed by Berne,
but rather a mere procedural obligation that could be harmonized
with the treaty.'11
49. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 16, at 43 (emphasis supplied).
50. See Final Report, supra note I 9, at 565-74. See also Kernochan, Comments on Discussion
Bill and Commentary Prepared for the April 15 Subcommittee Meeting as a Proposed Draft of Implementing Legislation to Permit U.S. Adherence to Berne, 10 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 693, 703
(1986) ("To say that registration is not a condition of copyright (§408) but a prerequisite for
suit (§411) is to posit a right that is wholly useless without formalities (because unenforceable)-in effect a right without a remedy, absent formalities .... The protestation ... in §
408 ... is empty of practical meaning.").
51. See testimony and statements of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and Assistant
Librarian for Copyright Services, reprinted in S. REP. No. 352, supra note 16 at 16-25.
These arguments were rejected by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, see S. REP. No.
352, supra note 16. Practice under the Berne Convention also belies the contentions. Berne
has never prohibited establishment of a mandatory system of deposits to the national library;
it simply forbids linking the sanction against nondeposit to enforcement of the copyright.
Imposition of fines is fully consistent with the treaty.
More significantly, the history of the Berne Convention contradicts the assertion that presuit registration is not a formality prohibited as a prerequisite to protection. Contemporaneous documents indicate that prerequisite-to-suit formalities were very much in the drafters'
minds. The Berlin revision Report refers to undesirable litigation delays caused by the original Convention's authorization to forum country courts to require production of a certificate
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Ultimately, Congress compromised on this question. The Berne
implementation legislation no longer requires registration as a prerequisite to initiation of an action alleging infringement of a Berne
work of non-U.S. origin, but retains the pre-suit requirement for works
of U.S. origin (and for non-Berne UCC works, and for works from
non-Berne countries with which the U.S. has bilateral copyright arrangements).112 This "two tiered" result, in which certain foreigners
are in effect favored over U.S. nationals, is possible under the Berne
Convention. As noted earlier, that treaty prescribes substantive minima of protection for works from Unionist countries; it does not demand that member countries accord their own works treaty-level protection.118 On the other hand, the "two-tiered" solution, according
foreign works superior protection, seems politically unstable. One
may anticipate that, eventually, even U.S.-works will be absolved
from subjection to the pre-suit formality.
While failure to register non-U.S. works from Berne countries no
longer impedes initiation of an infringement claim, this does not
mean that Unionist copyright proprietors should disregard the option to register. On the contrary, prompt registration remains extremely important. The 1976 Copyright Act, even with the 1988
amendments, retains substantial incentives to registration. These encouragements involve both proof of the copyright claim and remedies. If the work is registered within five years of publication, the
certificate of registration will serve as presumptive proof of the identity of the author, the dates of creation and publication, and the validity of the copyright. CM
attesting to completion of formalities in the country of origin. See Renault, Records of the
Conference Convened in Berlin, October 14 to November 14, 1908, English translation reprinted in
A. BOGSCH, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS OF THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

144, 148 (1986). Accord P. WAUWERMANS, LA CONVENTION DE
A BERLIN) POUR LA PROTECTION DES OEUVRES LITTERAIRES ET ARTISTIQUES 7273 (Brussels 1910) (delegate to 1908 conference) (branding a deposit prior to suit rule-such
as those then in force in France and in England-a Convention-barred formality rather than
a mere condition to court action).
52. Under the Berne Convention Implementation Act, a Berne work of U.S. origin is
either a work first published in the U.S.; or simultaneously published in the U.S. and in
either a Berne country having a longer copyright term, or in a non-Berne country; or first
published in a non-Berne nation when all authors are U.S. citizens, domiciliaries or residents
(or, for audiovisual works, when the producer's headquarters are in the U.S.); or an unpublished work whose authors are all U.S. citizens, domiciliaries, or residents (or, for audiovisual
works, whose producer's headquarters are in the U.S.); or a pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work incorporated in a building or structure located in the U.S. See The Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 4, § 101, 102 Stat. 2853, 2854 (1988).
53. See Berne Convention, supra note 6, arts. 5.1, 5.3.
54. 17 U .S.C. § 41 0(c).
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS
BERNE (REVISE£
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In addition, if the work is registered within three months of first
publication, statutory damages and attorneys' fees become available.1111 These can prove invaluable to a copyright complainant, particularly in the frequent instances where actual damages (plaintiffs lost
sales; defendant's profits) are speculative or otherwise difficult to
prove. The public performance right in nondramatic musical compositions presents a good example of the utility of statutory damages.
For instance, how does one value an unauthorized performance of
ten copyrighted songs over the radio or in a discotheque? Should the
value be the cost of a music performance license multiplied by the
percentage of the performance rights society's repertory which the
ten songs represent? If so, an infinitesimal amount would result. Indeed, were that the measure of damages (or even were the full cost of
a license the measure), a music-user might find it more economical to
be sued for copyright infringement than to acquire a performance
license. Copyright holders seeking to vindicate this right therefore
generally seek statutory damages. This permits the court to impose a
level of liability in excess of the cost of a performance license, thus
encouraging future compliance. 116 The 1988 amendments further enhance the attractions of early registration by doubling the maximum
amount of statutory damages from $50,000 to $100,000 per work. 117
55. Id. § 412.
56. See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 475 F.
Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), ajj'd, 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp.,
491 F. Supp. 908 (D. Conn. 1980).
57. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 10 (amending 17 U.S.C §
504(c)(2)), 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988); See 134 CoNG. REC. S 14554 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988)
for the Joint Explanatory Statement on House-Senate Compromise Incorporated in Senate Amendment
to H.R. 4262 (Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988) which states, with respect to the
Implementation Act's doubling of statutory damages: "The new statutory damages will only
apply to registrations made on or after the effective date of the Act." See Joint Explanatory
Statement reprinted in 36 J. CoPYR. Soc. 70, 76 (1988).
This statement finds no authority in the text of the Berne Implementation Act, and seems
clearly erroneous-most likely an inadvertence or misunderstanding by the joint statement
drafters. Section 13 of the Act states that the new legislation takes effect when the treaty
enters into force (March 1, 1989); the 1976 Act, as unamended, applies to "any cause of
action arising under [the Copyright Act] before the effective date of this [Berne Implementation] Act." The relevant date here is that of alleged infringement. If the claim arises after
March 1, 1989, the Berne amendments apply, and the statutory damages range from $200 to
$100,000. To limit availability of the 1988 amendments' increased damages to works registered after March 1, 1989 is to read the Berne Implementation Act as implying that copyright
infringement claims arise from registration, rather than from an act violating the § 106 rights.
That has not been the case under the 1976 Act (compare 1976 Act, § 30l(b)(3): State law
continues to apply to "any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978").
Moreover, the statement as worded makes no sense. It would defeat the formalities-reduc-
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Attorneys' fees offer another significant incentive to registration.
Unlike losing parties in most other countries, unsuccessful litigants in
the U.S. generally do not pay their opponents' attorneys. Given the
comparatively high costs of U.S. legal assistance, the award of attorneys' fees made possible by prompt registration, even if not commensurate with the sums actually charged, supplies a vital benefit.
Finally, two other aspects of registration deserve brief mention in
light of U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention. The 1988 amendments, moreover, did not explicitly address these issues. One concerns Customs Service enforcement of the copyright owner's right to
exclude imports of piratical copies; the other concerns criminal prosecutions for copyright infringement.
Section 602 of the Copyright Act empowers the copyright owner
to prevent the importation of copies or phonorecords acquired
outside the United States. The statute also authorizes the United
States Customs Service to prevent importation of foreign-acquired piratical copies. Although the Copyright Act does not itself tie the importation remedy to copyright registration, the regulations of the
Customs Service now require recordation of certificates of copyright
registration as a predicate to prevention of importation of infringing
copies. 58 One may therefore inquire whether these regulations clash
with Berne's "no formalities" principle.
A response first demands determination of whether Berne requires
or anticipates member countries' extension of importation remedies.
The treaty's text supplies an affirmative answer. Article 16 provides
for seizure of infringing copies, even those imported from countries
in which the work is not, or may no longer be, protected. 119 However,
the text also permits the seizure "to take place in accordance with
the legislation of each country." Nonetheless, this reference to local
law should probably not be read to suggest tolerance of local copying purpose of many of the l 988 amendments. If copyright claims depend on registration
rather than infringement, then registration becomes a key element of any claim, not merely
of claims seeking enhanced damages. Worse, it makes registration mandatory even for proprietors of non U.S.-Berne works. As a result, the U.S. would not be in compliance with
Berne standards.
58. 19 C.F.R. § l 33.3 l - l 33.33.
59. Moreover, under the national treatment standard, art. 5. l, Unionist authors enjoy not
only the protections specifically provided by the convention (such as importation protection),
but those afforded by member countries' domestic law. Because § 602 provides a remedy for
infringement of the exclusive distribution right under copyright, (§106(3)), foreign Berne
works would be entitled to this remedy. The trend of judicial opinions seems to reject suggestions that § 602 sets forth a special administrative remedy distinct from the usual rights
under copyright, see, e.g., Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (Pty.) Ltd., 847
F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. l 988).
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right formalities. Article 5's general proscription of formalities conditioning copyright enjoyment most likely continues to apply. This
does not mean the Customs officials may not require foreign Berne
claimants to substantiate the identity and ownership of the works at
issue; rather, Berne may require that means other than production of
a registration certificate suffice to establish the necessary proof. 60
The role of copyright registration in criminal infringement actions
is ambiguous. Section 411 (a) of the 1976 statute generally stated that
"no action for infringement" might be instituted prior to registration. The requirement thus applied both to civil and to criminal
claims. The Act's specific provisions on criminal enforcement carried
no independent registration requirement. With amendment of the
statute to remove registration as a prerequisite to suit for non-U.S.
Berne works, the modification should cover all actions, civil and
criminal.
Some question persists regarding criminal claims, however, because
of prior Justice Department practices. The Justice Department has
occasionally required production of copyright registration certificates
before initiating prosecutions for piracy of audiovisual works. 61 To
ensure Berne conformity, the Justice Department should probably alter internal procedures to exempt non-U.S. Berne works from this
requirement. It could be argued that criminal penalties are enhanced
copyright remedies not comprised within the basic copyright protection which must be assured, formality-free, to Unionist works. This
contention, however, contradicts the strongly voiced position asserted
by U.S. trade negotiators at General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GA TT) meetings. In their endeavors to obtain agreement on
a GA TT intellectual property code, U.S. representatives have insisted that minimal protections include criminal penalties. 62
60. CJ C. MASOUYE, GumE DE LA CONVENTION DE BERNE 113 (1978) (indicting modes of
proof which local authorities might require for enforcement of importation remedies: these
proofs include affidavits by local officials or by representatives of authors; none is as copyright-specific as a certificate of registration).
61. Interview with Crossan Andersen, Esq., former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Director of
Anti-Piracy Legal Operations, Motion Picture Ass'n of America, February 7, 1989.
62. U.S. Submission to the Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods § IV, Part 8, at 12, 15 ("criminal
remedies shall be available for at least trademark counterfeiting and copyright infringement
which are willful and commercial and shall include seizure of infringing goods, materials and
implements used in their creation, and forfeiture of such articles, imprisonment, and monetary fines") (c. September 1988).
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3.

Recordation of Contracts of Transfer
The 1976 Copyright Act contained an additional prereqms1te to
suit: if the copyright claimant was not the author, but a transferee of
exclusive rights, the Act conditioned initiation of an infringement action upon prior recordation with the Copyright Office of the instrument of transfer. 68 While this requirement might enable prospective
defendants to ascertain the validity of claimant's chain of title to the
work, courts had held that the claimant need record only the document under which he claims a transfer of rights; he need not record
all documents tracing the transfer of rights from the original copyright holder through to the present claimant.s.
The 1988 amendments to the Copyright Act abandon the requirement of pre-suit recordation. As of March 1989, a copyright claimant, whether from a Berne country, from the U.S., or from another
country with which the U.S. has copyright relations, no longer need
have recorded the instrument of transfer of copyright interests with
the Copyright Office before bringing the claim to court. 611 Of course,
once in court the claimant must still prove ownership of the copyright interests sued upon. In addition, recordation continues to serve
the purpose of settling rights between conflicting claimants to the
same copyright interest: ordinarily, the first-recorded transfer
prevails. 66

C.

Certain Territorial and Transitional Problems Regarding Formalities

Territorial Reach
As discussed above, affixation of notice upon publication cancels
the defense of innocent infringement. Similarly, substantial benefits
devolve from registration within stated periods from first publication.
But, what is the relevant place of publication? For example, does the
innocent infringement defense apply to notice-less copies of the work
acquired outside the U.S.? Does entitlement to statutory damages and
attorneys' fees depend on registration within three months of the
first U.S. publication, or within three months of first publication, in
whatever country that may occur?
1.

63.
64.
1982).
65.
66.

17 U.S.C. § 205(d).
See, e.g., Swarovski America Ltd. v. Silver Deer, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Colo.

See supra notes 40-49, and' accompanying text.
See l 7 U .S.C. § 205(e).
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Notice

In the case of notice, the Act authorizes the affixation of notice
"whenever a work protected under this title is published in the
United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner" (emphasis supplied). 87 This language had been interpreted under the
1976 Act to require affixation of notice upon a foreign author's first
publication abroad. As long as the foreign author was the national or
domiciliary of a country with which the U.S. has copyright relations,
or first published in such a country, the author automatically was
deemed a U.S. copyright owner, and therefore subject to U.S. law
requirements, including that of placing notice on copies distributed
inside or outside the U .S. 88
This interpretation indicates that non-U.S. copyright proprietors
may be susceptible to the post-Berne adherence defense of innocent
infringement in a U.S. copyright action, even though plaintiff had
not yet distributed the work in the U.S., and the copyright law of the
country in which defendant acquired a copy of the work imposed no
notice requirement. Suppose, for example, that a French author creates and sells videogames in France, but has not yet sought to exploit
the U.S. market. France has no notice requirement, not even the diluted version of an innocent infringer defense. A U.S. national
travelling in France observes the game at a trade show in France,
perceives that it does not bear a notice, and therefore concludes that
no copyright protection is claimed. Purchasing a copy and returning
home with it, the U.S. national copies and distributes the videogame.
If the above analysis is correct, the U.S. party would assert the innocent infringer defense, and perhaps obtain a diminution of damages.
This conclusion seems troubling. Under the law of the country
where our hypothetical defendant acquired a copy of the work, absence of notice did not entitle him to infer absence of protection.
This incongruity prompts another review of the U.S. law. The U.S.
Copyright Act requires the alleged innocent infringer to prove that
(s)he "had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted infringement of copyright. . . . " 89 The law of the country where the
copy was obtained should bear on the U.S. court's evaluation of
67. 17 U.S.C. § 40l(a).
68. See Hasbro-Bradley v. Sparkle Toys, 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985), discussed critically
in Ginsburg, Recent Developments in United States Copyright Law, 133 RIDA l 10, 146-56 Quly
1987).
69. l 7 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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whether or not defendant "had no reason to believe" the work was
protected. 70
b.

Registration

Turning to the statutorily relevant place of first publication with
regard to registration, the U.S. Copyright Act speaks of first publication generally; unlike the notice provision, the registration provisions
do not specify "in the United States or elsewhere." 71 One might
therefore conclude that, unlike publication for purposes of notice,
publication for registration is a purely U.S. territorial matter. The
deadlines for obtaining special registration benefits would therefore
run from first U.S. publication.
On the other hand, the Act also details that the application for
registration shall state "if the work has been published, the date and
nation of its first publication." 72 This suggests that "first publication"
under the U.S. Copyright Act means initial distribution anywhere in
the world. Indeed, such has been the Copyright Office's interpretation
of the 1976 Act. 78 As a result, foreign claimants seeking statutory
damages and attorneys' fees must register the work in the U.S. within
three months of actual first publication wherever that may occur;
similarly, prima facie evidentiary weight would be accorded a certificate of registration issuing within five years of actual first publication.
Which interpretation of the statutorily relevant place of first publication most assists the foreign claimant? With regard to the evidentiary benefits of registration, if the relevant place of publication is the
U.S., foreign claimants first publishing abroad may in fact have more
than five years in which to register the work with the U.S. Copyright
Office, and still claim the probative value of the registration certificate. In this case, then, limiting the statutorily relevant place of first
70. A similar analysis would apply to the innocent infringer defense in the case of preMarch 1989 notice-less copies. In that instance, § 405(b) of the 1976 Act would govern. That
provision removes liability by a person who can demonstrate "that he or she was misled by
the omission of notice." The law of the place of acquisition of the notice-less copy should be
taken into account in assessing whether defendant was "misled."
71. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 410,412.
72. Id. § 409(8).
73. See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium I/: Copyright Office Practices §§ 910, 910.01
( 1984). Copyright Practice under the 1909 Act also referred to publication anywhere in the
world. The time period for protection (28 years under the 1909 Act; 75 years for anonymous, pseudonymous and works for hire under the 1976 Act) ran from first publication; the
Copyright Office considered this date to be that of actual first publication; not first U.S.
publication.
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publication to the U.S. would afford some benefit to the foreign
claimant.
However, the outcome of applying the same rule to the case of
statutory damages and attorneys' fees seems much less favorable.
Suppose that a book has been published in Germany, but not in the
U.S. Unauthorized copies are subsequently distributed in the U.S.
While the U.S. courts will certainly entertain an ensuing infringement action, they will not award statutory damages or attorneys' fees.
These are not available to proprietors of unpublished works, unless
the work was registered prior to its infringement. 74 Thus, whether the
statutorily relevant place of publication is the U.S. or the place of
actual first publication, the advice is the same: to obtain the special
remedies of registration, all claimants should register the work with
the U.S. Copyright Office immediately after its creation if public release is possible or anticipated. Indeed, limiting the statutorily relevant place of first publication to the U.S. may in fact disserve the
foreign claimant. If the work has been published, the claimant enjoys
a three-month grace period in which to register, and still claim the
statutory remedies, even if infringement of the published work preceded the registration. As the above example shows, however, if the
work is not considered "published," no special statutory remedies are
available, unless registration preceded the infringement.
Moreover, selecting the place of actual first publication makes most
sense in the general scheme of international copyright. It affords a
single date from which to calculate the copyright terms of those
works for which the author's life does not serve as the measure.
Under the 1976 U.S. law, these works are anonymous and pseudonymous works, and works made for hire. Their terms run for 75 years
from publication. 711 Under many foreign laws, the term for anonymous and pseudonymous works runs for a period of at least fifty
years from the date of publication as welL 76 Similarly, in many countries, duration of protection for posthumous works, collective works,
and cinematographic works is also timed from first publication. 77 Be74. See 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). See also NBC Subsidiary (KNCNC-TV) Inc. v. Broadcast Info.
Servs. Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1732 (D. Colo. 1988) (no statutory damages for infringement of
unpublished television program).
75. Id. § 302(c).
76. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 7 .3 (fifty years from authorized public
distribution); France, law of March 11, 1957, art. 22 (fifty years; 70 years for musical compositions); Italy, law of April 22, 1941, art. 27 (fifty years); Spain, law of November 11, 1987,
art. 27 .2 (sixty years).
77. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.2 (cinematographic works: fifty years
from publication); France, supra note 76, arts. 22 (collective works: fifty years), 23 (posthu-
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cause it is not always easy to tell when acts amounting to a publication have occurred, 78 it would seem undesirable to multiply the number of places at which publications relevant to copyright duration
occur. 79

2.

Transitional Issues
The Berne enabling legislation provides that the 1988 amendments
to the U.S. copyright law take effect when ratification of the Berne
Convention enters into force (March 1989). The amendments do not
apply to claims which arose before March 1989. 80 Some questions regarding the application of the amendments nonetheless arise. One
issue concerns the pre-1989 notice requirement; another involves the
pre-1989 registration obligation.
mous works: fifty years; posthumous musical compositions: seventy years); Italy, supra note
76, arts. 26.2 (collective works: fifty years), 31 (posthumous works: fifty years, if publication
occurs within 20 years of author's death; the law states that the 50 years run from "the first
publication wherever it occurs"). See also art. 32 (cinematographic works: 50 years from first
public exhibition); Spain, supra note 76, arts. 27.1 (posthumous works: sixty years from first
publication, if that occurs within sixty years from the author's death), 28.2 (collective works:
sixty years).
78. See, e.g., Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1979), and decisions cited therein (the
Buru court attempted to discern whether a publication occurred, in U.S. or West Germany,
of U.S. author's film broadcast on West German television).
79. One should be aware, however, that even if one selects a uniform starting point for
the calculation of copyright duration, so long as there are differences among each country's
statutory periods, the copyright periods themselves will not be uniform, because the rule of
national treatment results in each country applying its own term. (But note that Berne Convention, art. 7.8 sets forth an exception to the national treatment rule: if the copyright term
in the country of origin is shorter than in the country where protection is sought, the shorter
term applies.) For example, suppose a collective work, such as a dictionary, is first published
in the U.S. in 1990, in France in 1995, in Spain in 2000, and in Italy in 2005. Were one to
count terms from each place of publication, the work would be protected in the U.S. till
2065, in France till 2045, in Spain till 2060, and in Italy till 2055. Were the U.S. publication
selected as the starting point, the terms would be U.S. 2065; France 2040; Spain 2050; Italy
2040. The objection to calculating duration based on multiple places of "first" publication
therefore cannot be disuniformity of resulting copyright term, but rather the difficulties attendant on proving publication in each territory. Multiple reference points inject unnecessary
further complication into the international administration of copyrighted works.
Finally, questions arise concerning the 1976 Act's definition of "publication". Like most
other copyright laws, U.S. law defines a publication as public distribution of copies. Unlike
most other copyright laws, however, the 1976 Act also defines as a publication "the offering
to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display," 17 U.S.C. § IOI. Does this definition apply to
acts accomplished wholly outside the U.S.? For example, would a Japanese audiovisual work
offered for public exhibition to movie theaters in Japan before March 1989 then be "published", and therefore be subject to U.S. notice requirements? Note that the 1976 Act definition does not require that the offer have been accepted.
80. See The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 13, § IOI, 102 Stat.
2853, 2861 (1988).
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a. Notice: Work Published Before March 1989; Infringed After
March 1989
If the Berne amendments apply to claims ansmg after March l,
1989, are pre-March 1989 failures to comply with the prior notice
requirement irrelevant so long as the alleged infringing acts occurred
after March 1989? This interpretation seems unlikely. Were the only
relevant act the alleged infringement, it would not matter when the
work was published, nor whether proper notice accompanied the
publication. That could mean that the copyright on a work which
had lapsed prior to March 1989 through failure to affix or cure the
omission of notice would, in effect, be revived by a claim alleging
post-March 1989 copying. But under U.S. law, once the work is in
the public domain, it must remain there. 81
What of a work published without notice during the five years preceding March 1989? According to the unamended 1976 Act, such a
work is not yet in the public domain, but failure to effect adequate
cure of the omission within five years will result in loss of copyright.
Does the intervening abolition of mandatory notice reliev.e these
copyright proprietors from the obligation to cure the omissions?
Here, the Berne Convention Implementation Act offers specific guidance. It provides that the curative measures apply "[ w]ith respect to
copies and phonorecords publicly distributed by authority of the
copyright owner before the effective date of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 [March 1989]." 82 Thus, works published before March 1989 must bear the notice, or effect proper cure
within five years. 88
81. See Id., § 12, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988) (amendments do "not provide copyright
protection for any work that is in the public domain in the United States"); see also United
Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
82.

See Id., § 7(e), § 405, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857-58 (1988).

83. Even without this precision, it seems clear that the operative date for application of
the notice-curing provisions would be that of first publication. Since, at that time, the work
should have borne a notice, the conditions for the omission's cure would continue to apply.
Otherwise, the subsistence of copyright in works in this time category would depend not on
the copyright holder's acts, but on the infringer's: occurrence of an alleged infringement
after March 1989, but before the conclusion of five years from the date of the notice-less
publication could buoy up a sinking copyright. By contrast, the non-curing copyright holder
not "fortunate" enough to have his work infringed during the five-year period would lose
protection. Holding all works published before March 1989 to compliance with the 1976
Act's notice terms yields a more rational outcome.
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b. Non-U.S. Berne Work Published (With Notice), But Not Registered, Before March 1989; Infringed After March 1989
If the alleged infringement of a non-U.S. Berne work follows the
effective date of the Berne amendments, but the work was published
before March 1989, must the work be registered with the Copyright
Office prior to initiation of suit? This question highlights an ambiguous area of transition between the 1976 Act and the 1988 amendments. If the relevant date for purposes of notice is that of first publication, should that also be the case for pre-suit registration, or should
it be the date of the infringement? With regard to pre-March 1989
unregistered works, unlike contemporaneous notice-less works, the
Berne Implementation Act does not explicitly preserve the application of the 1976 Act. Moreover, differences between the purposes
and effects of the notice and registration formalities point toward a
literal reading of the Implementation Act's designation of the date of
infringement. While the 1976 Act required affixation of notice in order to prevent the work from falling into the public domain, 84 presuit registration neither gave rise to nor preserved the copyright.
Thus, where application of the 1988 amendments to prior works
published without notice could violate the constitutional principle of
protection for "limited Times" 86 by retrieving a work from the public domain, no revival of a lapsed copyright would occur were the
1988 amendments applied to a prior unregistered work.
Moreover, unlike notice, pre-suit registration under the 1976 Act
was not a device primarily designed to inform potential defendants of
the status of a work's copyright. Registration on the eve of filing the
copyright action met the Act's pre-suit obligation. 88 Indeed, some
courts have permitted the action to go forward, even when registration occurs after filing the claim. 87 Such belated execution of the formality belies a meaningful notice-giving function; rather, pre-suit registration may most accurately be viewed as an effective means to
84. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
85. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 46206-08 (Nov. 6, I 985) (copyright office will process expedited
"special handling" requests "in cases involving pending or prospective litigation"); 49 Fed.
Reg. 39741-42 (Oct. 10, 1984) (same). Courts routinely accept eve of suit registrations. See,
e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnoo, 637 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1983); Wales
Indus. v. Hasbro-Bradley, 612 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Co-opportunities Inc. v. NBC,
510 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
87. See, e.g., Hulex Music v. Santy, 698 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.H. 1988); Financial Information v. Moody's Investors Service, 599 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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compel Library of Congress deposits, and to keep copyright records
complete, if not fully up-to-date.
II.

Some Specific Features of U.S. Copyright Law Remaining
Unchanged, Despite Berne Adherence

The 1988 Berne Implementation Act leaves several aspects of the
1976 U.S. Copyright Act untouched. Most notably, the 1988 amendments include no provisions explicitly recognizing authors' "morai
rights" to claim attribution of their works and to prevent the alteration or mutilation of their works. In addition, the adapting legislation
expands the definition of protected "pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works" to include architectural plans and models, yet makes no specific mention of the completed, three-dimensional structure. These
omissions may appear inconsistent with Berne requirements: Article
6bis of the Convention calls for protection of moral rights; Article 2
lists "works of ... architecture" and "three dimensional works relative to ... architecture" among works which "shall enjoy protection
in all countries of the union." 88 Both deserve discussion.
A.

Architectural Works

Here, Berne standards and U.S. copyright doctrines appear dissonant: the treaty anticipates protection both of representations of architectural works (plans and models) and of the structures themselves. While U.S. law protects the former, its protection of the latter
is arguably very limited. The 1976 Copyright Act denies protection
to the utilitarian aspects of decorative articles:
Pictorial, graphic and sculptural works ... shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article ... shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to
the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural

88. There is yet another issue regarding the compatibility of U.S. law with the Berne
Convention. Article 18 extends treaty protection to "all works which, at the time of [the
treaty's] coming into force [including "in the case of new accessions to the Union"], have not
yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through expiry of the term of
protection." The 1988 amendments to the U.S. copyright law are prospective only; they do
not accord protection to works still under copyright in their Unionist countries of origin but
which, prior to U.S. adherence, had no coverage here, or whose copyrights expired after an
initial U.S. copyright term too short to meet Berne minima. This article does not examine
the retroactivity question because the issue has been carefully reviewed in the Final Report,
supra note 19, at 587-95. See also H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 51-52.
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features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 89

This "separability" rule may disqualify most structures, especially
those eschewing fanciful, profuse decoration. (As an example of a
protectible, separable architectural feature, the legislative reports cite
"a gargoyle on a building"). 9 ° Certainly Bauhaus would not fare well
under this test. Moreover, the restrictions on what kind of structures
may be copyrighted carry over to the scope of protection of architectural plans. Many courts have held that copying plans is copyright
infringement, but that building the structure from the plans is not
infringement. 91 The basis for the distinction appears to be that while
plans are protected as two-dimensional works, the resulting building
is not protected (unless it meets the separability test). Constructing
the building, therefore, is like carrying out any other unprotected
process. For example, copyright protects against unauthorized copying of a book explaining how to repair a car, but copyright does not
secure exclusive rights in the exercise of the repair. 92
If, under current U.S. copyright law, building the three-dimensional structure from two-dimensional plans is not copyright infringement, what of two-dimensional representations, such as commercially
distributed photographs, of completed structures? If the separability
rule disqualifies the building from copyright protection, then arguably one may photograph the building as freely as one would photograph a flower or a tree, or any other object in nature. Nonetheless,
this result seems to exceed the rationale for the separability rule. The
rule exists to prevent copyright from becoming a kind of back-door
patent: claimants may not monopolize useful features; if the useful
and the decorative cannot be divided, the public domain prevails.
Hence, it may make sense to limit protection so that copyright does
not hamper a second-comer in constructing a similarly functioning
building. Constricting the copyright to permit unauthorized commercial exploitation of images of the structure does not promote the
building trades, but simply removes from the architect's control a
89. 17 u.s.c. § 101.
90. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 16 at 51; S. REP. No. 352, supra note 16, at 9.
91. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F.Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But see Robert R.
Jones Assoc., v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 294 (6th Cir. I 988) ("one may construct a house
which is identical to a house depicted in copyrighted architectural plans, but one may not
directly copy those plans and then use the infringing copy to construct the house").
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (copyright does not protect methods and processes).

26

COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[Vol. 13:1

substantial area of exploitation of purely decorative derivative
works. 93
Does the separability rule set U.S. copyright law at odds with the
Berne Convention? If read to require that the claimed design feature
be physically separable from the structure's useful aspects, the rule
probably would eliminate all but the most baroque or bizarre buildings, 94 and therefore might well clash with the treaty. But, there may
be a more generous notion of separability. The legislative reports to
the 1976 Act suggest that if the artistic design of a useful object is
"conceptually" separable from the utilitarian purpose, the work may
qualify for copyright. 911 A consistent understanding of "conceptual
separability" has so far eluded the courts, 96 but the notion may have
the potential to encompass a broader range of structures. Assume
that the courts developed a rule that a design feature is conceptually
separable if its appearance was not compelled by the useful purpose of
the building. In that case, even useful elements in the design might
be protected, so long as the arrangement of the useful elements
proved arbitrary. For example, the painted steam pipes along the
outside of the Pompidou Center in Paris certainly perform a useful
purpose. But no canons of construction compel their placement all
over the building's exterior. Where the Pompidou Center might fail
the physical separability test (one cannot remove the steam pipes and
still have a functioning building), it would appear to pass muster
under the above proposed conceptual separability rule. 97
93. Compare Paris Court of Appeals, decision of June 19, 1979, discussed in Fremond, Les
droits sur ['image d'un immeuble, 9 CAHIERS DU DROIT o'AUTEUR 12, 13 (1988) (the individualized reproduction of a house, by means of a photograph, violates the architect's exclusive
rights; had the house been captured as part of an overall ensemble, no infringement would
have been found).
94. As an example of the latter, the Copyright Office recently registered as a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work an ice cream stand in the shape of a cup of swirled frozen yogurt.
Interview with William F. Patry, Esq., Policy Planning Advisor to the Register of Copyrights,
February 9, 1989.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. at 55 (1976).
96. Compare Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (divided court holds belt buckle conceptually separable on ground that it can serve a purely
decorative purpose; these buckles were used not only for holding up pants-useful purpose-but as decorative brooches), with Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773
F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (divided court holds molded shirt forms not conceptually separable)
with Brandir Int'! v. Pacific Cascade Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (divided court
holds curved metal bicycle rack not conceptually separable on ground that the shape of the
rack was influenced by the artist's desire to accommodate the form to bicycles).
97. A recent article extensively reviewing current U.S. copyright doctrine regarding architectural works offers another, well-developed example of "conceptually separable" architectural designs. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works, 37 S.C.L.B. REv. 393,
430-31 (1986).
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Ultimately, it may be too soon to tell whether U.S. copyright law
on architectural works conforms to Berne standards. The courts continue to elaborate the separability rule, and they may well evolve a
test compatible with treaty norms. In addition, the Copyright Office
is studying the question, and may issue recommendations to Congress
for further emendation of the Copyright Act to ensure fuller protection of works of architecture. 98 Finally, one should bear in mind that
other legal doctrines may supplement the architect's remedies. Very
recently, a trial court held that the unauthorized construction of the
interior features of a house copied from plaintiffs house violated
state unfair competition law. In that instance, defendant had entered
plaintiffs house while it was under construction, had taken photographs and measurements of the interior, and had reconstituted
building plans. Defendant then built a substantially identical
house-across the street!99
B.

Moral Rights

As mentioned earlier, the Berne Implementation Act includes no
explicit recognition of moral rights. Rather, the Act assumes that the
extant U.S. protection of rights of attribution and of integrity meet
Berne standards. Nonetheless Congress has left room for the domestic law expansion of current protections of moral rights. While Congress' failure to include affirmative dispositions governing moral
rights may attract some criticism, particularly from abroad, it is important to recognize that the little that Congress did say was far better for moral rights than what Congress might have said, and almost
did say. It is illuminating to review the history leading up to Congress' ultimate position on moral rights, and then to consider how far
U.S. law is in fact compatible with Berne.
1. Legislative History
The Ad Hoc Working Group considered at some length the compatibility of U.S. law with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
which bestows on authors the rights,
98. Congress, perhaps uncertain of its compliance with Berne standards for architectural
works, had requested a Copyright Office study on protection of architectural works. See S.
REP. No. 352, supra note 16, at 9.
99. Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In an earlier phase of
this case, see supra note 91, the court held that defendant had also made illicit copies of the
building plans, and that the copying of the plans constituted copyright infringement. On the
other hand, neither "reverse engineering" the plans by inspecting the house, nor building
the house qualified as copyright infringement.
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[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of said rights ... to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation.

This same disposition provides for continuance of these rights for at
least a minimum period after death, but leaves the means for protection to "the legislation of the country where protection is claimed."
The Working Group's Final Report concluded as follows:
Given the substantial protection now available for the real equivalent
of moral rights under statutory and common law in the U.S., the lack of
uniformity in protection of other Berne nations, the absence of moral
rights provisions in some of their copyright laws, and the reservation of
control over remedies to each Berne country, the protection of moral
rights in the United States is compatible with the Berne Convention.1°0

The similarly worded conclusion in its Preliminary Report had
evoked dissenting, doubting, and approving comments. 101 It was clear
that the question of moral rights would present particular difficulties
for the marshaling and maintaining of adequate support for the bill.
Resolution of the moral rights issue would be critical to the bill's
enactment.
A number of bills were introduced in Congress aimed in varying
terms at reshaping U.S. law to meet some or all of the several points
identified as possibly or necessarily requiring change for Berne adherence.102 Only one of them, the Kastenmeier bill, H.R. 1623, contained a provision on moral rights. Section 7 of that bill called for
insertion in the U.S. Copyright Law of a new section § 106(a) reading as follows:
§ I 06a. Moral rights of the author
Independently of the copyright in a work other than a work made for
hire, and even after a transfer of copyright ownership, the author of the
work or the author's successor in interest shall have the right, during
the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death100. Final Report, supra note 19, at 547. Professor Ralph S. Brown has colorfully expressed moral rights advocates' skepticism about the Final Report, characterizing its conclusion as "fashion[ing] a loincloth or at least a G-string, that will cover our moral rights nakedness," Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. CoPYR.
Soc. 196, 204 (1988).
101. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 19, Appendix B: Damich, Moral Rights in the United
States and Article 6bis of the Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, at 655-63; Geller, Comments on Possible
U.S. Compliance with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, at 665-81; Kernochan, Comments of
John M. Kernochan, at 685-91.
102. See supra note 28.
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(1) to claim authorship of the work; and
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration of the
work that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation.
The rights conferred by this section shall be referred to in this title as
moral rights. 103

This provision "set the cat among the pigeons", triggering a major
reaction. It satisfied neither proponents nor opponents of moral
rights. It did not accurately track the language of Article 6bis as to
the right of integrity. 1 °' It exempted works for hire. In addition,
under § 9 of the bill, a proposed new § l l 9(a) made the moral rights
thus provided freely waivable and assignable. § l l 9(b) stated too, that
absent any contrary contractual provision, or contrary notice at the
time of consent to use of a work,
[t]he necessary editing, arranging, or adaptation of the work for publication or use in printed or machine-readable form, in broadcasting, in
motion pictures, or in phonorecords, in accordance with customary standards and reasonable requirements of preparing a work for dissemination, shall not constitute an infringement of any of an author's moral
rights.

Moral rights proponents saw these prov1s1ons as creating illusory
rather than real moral rights. Moral rights opponents, roused to consternation by any reference to moral rights, perceived the Kastenmeier bill's provisions as too vague to give guidance, and as an
invitation to litigation, despite the extremely diluted nature of the
rights actually granted.
In the late stages of development of the Berne legislation, the
moral rights provisions were dropped from the Kastenmeier bill, ap103. H.R. 1623, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 35 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
(BNA) 550 (1987).
I 04. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention provides:
(I) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained at least until the expiry of the economic rights,
and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation
of the country where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the
preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death,
cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.

J.
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parently in favor of the position taken by the Ad Hoc Group that
U.S. copyright law and other legal doctrines, as they existed and as
they were developing, provided an adequate practical equivalent to
Berne's Article 6bis moral rights. It may be noted that Dr. Bogsch,
Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the international body charged with administering the
Berne Convention, had endorsed this position. 1011
The moral rights struggle then shifted to another far more threatening phase-an effort by opponents not only to prevent the enactment of genuine moral rights, but to freeze the U.S. law
"equivalents" (relied on as adequate by the Ad Hoc Group) as of the
Act's effective date, thus interdicting the future development of
moral rights under copyright or other legal theories. A proposal by
Senator Hatch would have inserted the following language in various
places in the Berne adherence legislation:
(b) No author, or author's successor in interest, independently of the
author's economic rights, shall be entitled on and after the effective
date of this Act to any moral rights [i.e. of paternity or integrity -Ed.]
under any Federal or State statutes or the common law.
(c) Any right of an author, or an author's successor in interest,
whether under any provision of Federal or State statutes or the common
law that, independently of the author's economic rights, is equivalent to
any or all of the moral rights or any part thereof shall not, on and after
the effective date of this Act, be expanded or enlarged either by Federal
or State statute or by judicial construction. 166

However, the Berne adherence proponents ultimately succeeded in
repelling this attack and in securing instead the legislation quoted in
the footnote below, 107 which leaves existing U.S. law on moral rights
105. See letter of June 16, 1987 from Dr. Bogsch to Irwin Karp, Esq., reprinted in pertinent
part at H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 16, at 37. The letter states: "In my view, it is not
necessary for the United States of America to enact statutory provisions on moral rights in
order to comply with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. The requirements under this
Article can be fulfilled not only by statutory provisions in a copyright statute but also by
common law and other statutes. I believe that in the United States the common law and such
statutes (Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act) contain the necessary law to fulfill any obligation
for the United States under Article 6bis."
106. S. 1971, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
107. SEC. 3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERNE CONVENTION
. . . (b) CERTAIN RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED. - The provisions of the Berne
Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and satisfaction of United
States obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an author of a
work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the common law (1) to claim authorship of the work; or
(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author's honor or
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"equivalents" in place and allows it to develop, though U.S. courts
would be forbidden to look to the Berne Convention to support that
growth. In the end, those who favor the further evolution of moral
rights in the U.S. may take satisfaction in the knowledge that such an
evolution can still take place and that a major disaster-the destruction of such rights and the freezing of their equivalents now and for
the future-was averted.

2.
a.

Compatibility of U.S. Moral Rights with Berne Standards

Right of Integrity

Although U.S. copyright law does not recognize an author's specific independent moral rights, the 1976 Copyright Act has assimilated certain features of moral rights under the rubric of economic
rights. For example, while the Act affords no right of integrity per se,
it does provide a basis for objection to alterations of works. Modification creates a "derivative work," the creation of which is one of the
enumerated exclusive rights in § 106. 108 To be sure, the right to
make derivative works is considered an economic right, part of the
bundle of exploitation rights contained in a "copyright." Nonetheless, it can arguably be used to protect moral, rather than (or as well
as) economic, interests. There is, however, an important limitation:
an author who has authorized the creation of a derivative work may
no longer object to the grantee's alterations, unless a contract limits
reputation.
SEC. 4. SUBJECT MATTER AND SCOPE OF COPYRIGHTS
a) SUBJECT AND SCOPE-Chapter I is amended(3) in section 104 by adding at the end thereof the following:
. . . (c) EFFECT OF BERNE CONVENTION. - No right or interest in a work
eligible for protection under this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance
upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States
thereto. Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title that d~rive from
this title, other Federal or State statutes, or the common law, shall not be expanded
or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention,
or the adherence of the United States thereto . . . .
SEC. 6. PREEMPTION WITH RESPECT TO OTHER LAWS NOT AFFECTED.
Section 301 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"(e) The scope of Federal preemption under this section is not affected by the adherence of the United States to the Berne Convention or the satisfaction of obligations of the United States thereunder."
Berne Implementation Act, supra note 1.
108. Article 106(2) of the U.S. Copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), grants the exclusive
right to authorize derivative works. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
declared that a broadcaster's unauthorized cutting of an audiovisual work violated the exclusive derivative works right. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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the nature of the alterations permitted, or reserves a right to approve
modifications. In other words, under the American copyright statute,
the derivative works right, to the extent that it embraces a right of
integrity, is waivable and alienable. 109 Moreover, like other rights in
the statute which have a right of integrity flavor, 110 it is a copyright
owner's, and not necessarily an author's, right.
Does the transferability of moral rights interests violate Berne standards? Probably not. The treaty's specification of the independence
of the rights of integrity and attribution from economic rights simply
ensures that a grant of economic rights does not, of itself, entail a
ceding of moral rights. Unlike certain national laws, the Berne Convention does not state that moral rights are "inalienable. "m Comparing the Berne text with more strongly worded national provisions,
a leading commentator concludes that "there is nothing ... which
prohibits national laws from allowing authors to assign their moral
rights either temporarily or permanently." 112 If this be so, one may
properly argue that the derivative works right provides a measure of
moral rights equivalence.
A more significant problem may be that in U.S. law the protection
of derivative rights is not likely to afford much benefit to certain
kinds of creative contributors to copyrighted works. The reason is
that, under the Copyright Act, copyright (and therefore the derivative works right) belongs to the author, but the "author" is not always the actual person who created the work. According to the
"works made for hire" rules, the employer, whether a physical or a
juridical person, is deemed the "author" of works prepared by em109. See, e.g., the remarks of Representative Kastenmeier accompanying his Bill to modify
the U.S. copyright law to facilitate U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention, 33 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 555, 558 (l 987) (asserting that, according to traditional property rules, all intellectual property rights must be alienable). But see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5)
(author's right to terminate transfers is inalienable); Horowitz, The Record Rental Amendment
of 1984: A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology, 12 Colum.-VLA
J.L. & Arts 31 (l 987) (discussing restraints on alienation).
110. See 17 U .S.C. § I l 5(a)(2) (compulsory license to make phonorecords includes right to
make arrangement of nondramatic musical composition, "but the arrangement shall not
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work"); § 110(4) (objection to certain exempted public performances of nondramatic literary or musical material). Only the
termination right in § 203, whose exercise is not necessarily related to moral rights, is reserved expressly to the author.
l l l. Compare France, Law No. 57-298 on literary and artistic property of Mar. l I, 1957,
art. 6, official French text in Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran~aise (Mar. 14, 1957), English translation reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD.
112. S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION: 1886-1986 467 (1987). See also C. MASOUYE,
GUIDE DE LA CONVENTION DE BERNE 46-4 7 ( 1978) (local courts enjoy under the Berne Convention "some freedom of action" in evaluating the legitimacy of a waiver of moral rights).
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ployees in the course of their duties. 113 So too is one who commissions the creation of a work, if the contract provides that the work
will be deemed a "work made for hire," and if the work falls within
certain categories prescribed in the Act. m
As a result, in the U.S., many creators' rights (if any) to ensure the
integrity of their works must come from sources other than the copyright law. Contract law may afford one of these. Even with the status
of a "non-author," a creator with sufficient bargaining power may
provide contractually for some measure of control over his or her
work. m But, at best, this technique may afford only uncertain security; the rights may not be directly opposable against non-parties to
the contract. 116
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining works made for hire).
114. Id. Some recent decisions, however, have raised questions as to whether commissioners of works may not have even broader claims to authorship status. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1985). But see Dumas
v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting work for hire characterization of
commissioned works other than those listed in § l 0 l ; for all other works, work for hire status
requires a creator to have been a "formal, salaried employee."). The U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to hear argument on whether a party commissioning the creation of a work not listed
in the work for hire definition of§ 101 may nonetheless be deemed an "employer," and
therefore an "author." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. granted, l 09 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
·
Several recent publications include thorough reviews of the legislative history leading to
the adoption of the current definition of ··works made for hire." See, e.g., Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 888-90, 899-901 (1987); Note,
Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and
Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1987) (both of these studies conclude that § l 0 l should be
read literally, to exclude from authorship status parties commissioning works other than
those listed in § 101).
115. See, e.g., Harmetz, "ABC Cancels 'Reds' After Prohibition on Editing," N.Y. Times,
April 17, 1985, at C26, col. l, regarding film director Warren Beatty's refusal to authorize
the television broadcast of an edited version of his film "Reds"; Mr. Beatty's contract granted
him absolute control over the final version of the film ("right of final cut").
116. Arguably, the copyright holder's grantee might be subject to the creator's equitable
claim, if a court determined that his retention of control in effect amounted to a servitude
running with the work. Even assuming the possibility that a court would admit the principle
of an equitable servitude on the grantee's exercise of the copyright, several factors may make
substantiation of the claim unlikely. First, the creator-copyright holder agreement must
clearly manifest an intention to bind subsequent acquirers. Second, the subsequent acquirer
must have notice of the limitation. Third, there must be no contrary public policy which
would override enforcement of the director's claim. See generally, Chaffee, The Music Goes
Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956); Chaffee,
Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928).
As to the first and second elements, it is improbable that most contracts potentially at issue
meet the required level of specificity. With regard to the third factor, the federal copyright
law may well preempt the state law equitable claim. The claim amounts to an encumbrance
on the exercise of federal rights under copyright, and thus may be held to interfere impermissibly with the federal scheme. Cf Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270
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If the work for hire rule compromises certain creators' integrity
interests, are U.S. moral rights protections insufficient under Berne?
While, as a practical matter, the rule would seem to cut a large swath
out of moral rights protections, this result may not contravene the
treaty. This is because Berne may well tolerate each member country's designation of authorship status. 117 In other words, Berne provides that the "author" shall enjoy moral rights; but Berne does not
clearly direct that its signatories rank as "authors" only the physical
persons who in fact created the work.
Certain other non-copyright theories may better bolster the integrity interest. For example, the federal unfair competition law (and
analogous state laws) may serve to protect the integrity interest of an
author's work that has been mutilated by another but attributed to
the author. 118 Thus, in Gilliam v. ABC 119 (the "Monty Python" case),
the U.S. broadcaster of an English television program had, without
the authors' permission, cut 24 of 90 minutes, or more than a quar(5th Cir. 1988) (holding preempted a state law authorizing "shrink-wrap licenses" purporting
to forbid exercise of rights afforded under a provision of the federal copyright act).
Further objections to persistence of the state claim arise if some states recognize the equitable servitude, but others do not; the grantee could exercise the copyright in some states, but
not in others. When exercise of the copyright involves broadcasting, or similar activities simultaneously penetrating many states' borders, to respect the prohibition of one state may
mean to refrain from conduct lawful in all or most of the others. In such an instance, the
prohibition of the one, or of the few, should probably yield. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1940). In this case, the court declined to recognize asserted
equitable servitude arising out of "not for broadcast" labels on sound recordings. While acknowledging that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 37 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937), had reached a contrary decision, and that broadcast of
the records into Pennsylvania would thus be a tort in that state, the court refused to enter an
injunction for the sole benefit of Pennsylvania, when all surrounding territories would not
uphold the servitude: "even if it be mechanically possible to prevent any broadcasting
through the angle which the state of Pennsylvania subtends at the transmission station, that
would shut out points both in front of, and beyond, Pennsylvania. We must therefore choose
between denying any injunction whatever-since in our judgment the act is unlawful only in
Pennsylvania-or enjoining [defendant] from broadcasting throughout the Union and in Canada in order to prevent a tort in Pennsylvania alone.")
117. See Final Report, supra note 19, at 615 & n.3, and authorities cited therein. But see
Ginsburg, Colors in Conflicts: Moral Rights and the Foreign Exploitation of Colorized U.S. Motion
Pictures, 36 J. CoPR. Soc'v 81, 86-87 ( 1988) (suggesting that, at least for audiovisual works,
Berne implicitly accords authorship status to the actual, physical creator).
118. Indeed, attribution to the author of another's radical (or particularly inept) alterations may give rise to a defamation claim. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8
N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643 (1960). And claims based on privacy and publicity protections
may also be of use against some alterations, and may indeed represent a promising avenue of
future development in relation to attribution and integrity, rooted as they are (along with
moral rights) in rights of personality. See Final Report, supra note 19, at 555 & n.31, and
authorities cited therein.
119. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ter of the program. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared that such extensive editing so profoundly altered the
character of the work that it would have been inaccurate, indeed deceptive, to attribute the work to the Python authors. This ruling is
not based on a copyright infringement theory. The court's discussion
addressed the federal unfair competition law prohibiting false representations and false designations of a product or service's origin. 120
Other courts have also acknowledged that radical cutting of a film
for television broadcast may lead to a false designation of origin. 121
But, if the changes to the work are clearly labeled as the product of
someone other than the author, it may be argued that there is no
deception in the public presentation of the work; if the source of
commercial falsehood is removed, the theory goes, the unfair competition-and perhaps the defamation-claims vanish as well. 122
Nonetheless, the utility of false representation claims should not be
undervalued. As the Monty Python court observed, often attempts to
label the film to inform the public of unauthorized alterations will
not cure the false impression caused by the broadcast. This is especially so when the television viewer has no means to compare the
complete work to the broadcast version. 123 In fact, a false representation claim may often furnish a viable means to protect the creator's
right of integrity in those kinds of works not susceptible to effective
disclaimers. 124
120. See Lanham Federal Trademarks Act§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § I l25(a) (1982) [hereinafter § 43(a)].
121. See, e.g., Jaeger v. American lnt'I Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
This decision observes, however, that the concept of false designation can be difficult to apply when the work is the fruit of many authors' labors. Audiovisual works often fit this
description.
122. The limitations of the false representation claim flow from the fundamental difference between the goal of this claim and the goal of a moral rights claim. A false representation action seeks to prevent public confusion arising out of false advertising, false source designations, and similar deceptive acts. If the public is given clear notice of the nature of the
alterations made to a work, then, arguably, the purveyor has complied with the requirements
of the law prohibiting false designations. By contrast, moral rights seek to protect an author's
individual creative concerns fr~m harm whatever the nature of the labeling. For a fuller discussion of the difference between a consumer protection claim and a moral rights claim, see
Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1490,
1499-1500 (1979).
I 23. See 538 F.2d at 25, n. I 3.
124. Because of the difference in theory, claims under § 43(a) or state unfair competition
laws may not be effective against mutilations in the case, for example, of a privately-held
work. On the other hand, moral rights relief against mutilations which are not publicly disclosed may also be doubtful under French law. See Buffet v. Fersing, Paris Court of Appeals,
May 30, 1962, 1962 D.Jur. 579, note Desbois; Fran~on & Ginsburg, Author's Rights in France:
The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioned Work to Compel the Commissioning Party to Com-
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Right of Attribution

The right of attribution regarding a work neither altered nor mutilated seems more secure under current U.S. legal doctrines, despite
an early inhospitable reception at state common law. 1211 The same
provision of the federal trademarks and unfair competition law ap- .
plied by the Monty Python court has also been invoked in complaints
by authors and other creative contributors that authorship or similar
credit was improperly accorded to a third party.· These plaintiffs asserted that attributing their work to another constituted a false representation or false designation of origin of goods in interstate commerce. Their claims have succeeded where defendant copied from
plaintiffs work, and cast himself as the author,1 26 where one co-author removed the names of his two co-authors, presenting a musical
work as his alone, 127 and where a book's editor failed to acknowledge
the full extent of the contribution of one group of authors, conveying the impression that the work was almost entirely the product of a
third party .128
Does a simple denial of authorship credit, without misattribution to
a third party, or without misrepresenting the extent of a co-author's
contribution, also constitute a false representation? One might argue
that nonattribution inevitably entails falsehood; for example, it can
falsely suggest that the author wished to remain anonymous. The
Ninth Circuit has characterized nonattribution as "implied reverse
passing off;" explicit misattribution or misrepresentation is "express
reverse passing off." Both kinds of reverse passing off "involuntarily
deprive [the creator] of the advertising value of its name and of the
plete the Work, 9 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381, 392-93 & n.44 ( 1985 ).
§ 43(a) may be an imperfect substitute for moral rights for other reasons as well. "Commerce" is an express element governing its application. One court has indicated that "competition" between the parties is a prerequisite to invocation of § 43(a). See Halicki v. United
Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, perhaps unfair competition law cannot reach destruction of a work, nor stand against a copyright owner's waiver.
See Krigsman, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a Defender of Artists' Moral Rights, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 251 ( 1983). See generally Verbit, Moral Rights and§ 4 J(a) of the Lanham Act: Oasis or
Illusion,, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 579 (1988).
The revised version of§ 43(a), effective Nov. 16, 1989, does not appear to affect the questions raised in this footnote.
125. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
126. Marling v. Ellison, 218 U.S.P.Q. 702 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
127. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988).
128. Dodd v. Ft. Smith School Dist., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395 (W.D. Ark. 1987). Cf Follett v.
New American Library, 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding author's claim that he
was improperly credited as the principal author rather than as one of several authors of the
work).
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goodwill that otherwise would stem from public knowledge of the
true source of the satisfactory product. The ultimate purchaser (or
viewer) is also deprived of knowing the true source of the product
. . . " 129 As the law has been developing, one can well hope that the
courts will still more clearly enunciate an affirmative (noncontractual)
right to compel attribution, m the absence of express
misattribution. 130
In discussing the "equivalents" to the moral rights protections that
have led the proponents of Berne adherence to believe that compliance is now adequate, with promise of a continuing favorable evolution, it would be amiss not to mention the utility of the law specifically governing trademarks (as against the more general unfair
competition theory discussed above), for trademark registration or
recognition can be relevant to both attribution and integrity. The
federal administrative body which rules on registration appeals has
declared that the name of an author can be registered as a trademark
for the works the author produces. 131 The full implications of this
have yet to be explored, but they may well bear on the enforcement
of rights close or equivalent to moral rights. 132
The existing U.S. law as it applies to attribution and integrity will
certainly not satisfy the most fervent apostles of moral rights in the
U.S. or abroad, but the Ad Hoc Working Group was not disingenuous when it urged, and Congress and the Director of WIPO concurred, that there are real protections in the U.S. for moral right
interests, even if these are not identical in theory or in all their
ramifications to those hallowed by continental European tradition.
For proponents of moral rights in the U.S., adherence to Berne is
not the end, it is rather the beginning of new efforts to reform U.S.
law.1aa
129. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Lamothe, supra note I 27, at
n.2 ("defendants did not simply remove all trace of the source of the product, which might
itself be actionable as implied reverse passing off').
130. See Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, supra note 114 (joint owner of
copyright in sculptural work, upon exercising right to reproduce the work, "might be obliged
to credit [the sculptor of a portion of the work] as an author of the sculpture") (dictum).
131. In re Wood, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1345 (1983).
132. W.M. BORCHARD, TRADEMARKS AND THE ARTS (1989), chapter V. And see id. preface,
pp. iv-v noting that "protections accorded as a matter of course to the makers of industrial
products have not been fully accorded to, let alone claimed by, the makers of another kind of
product - artistic creation."
133. It has not escaped notice in the U.S. that Berne-member legislation and Berne-member action to enforce rights of integrity range from total absence of effective protection to
detailed and thorough regulation. See Final Report, supra note 19, at 548-51. The U.S. is
certainly not in the lowest end of the range and its awareness and activity are certainly grow-

38

CoLUMBIA-VLA JouRNAL OF LAW

& THE ARTS

[Vol.

13:1

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention, one
hundred and two years after the treaty's enactment, occasioned some
changes to, and much reflection about, U.S. copyright law. If the risk
of barbaric forfeitures for lapses in formalities has been eliminated,
both U.S. and foreign copyright holders would nonetheless be well
advised, as a practical matter, to take the same steps to protect their
works as they did (or should have done) under the 1976 Act. Despite
the further shrinkage of the notice and registration formalities, compliance still produces important and valuable benefits.
While the legislative session which produced Berne adherence did
not also provide extensively for moral rights, creators may nonetheless anticipate, and work toward, further development in that area.
Concerted efforts are needed to shape U.S. moral rights with sensitivity to the special needs and problems of affected industries, without sacrificing the ultimate need to protect the interests of authors of
works of the mind. Legislation and court decisions in other countries,
such as France, indicate that these kinds of accommodations are
possible. 184

ing. In many ways the concept of moral right is still inchoate, even in "advanced" moral
rights nations, with respect to its impact in many practical situations. It may even be hoped
that U.S. experience and efforts will help to clarify the emerging issues as they confront the
tide of new technology, new media; and new art forms.
134. See, e.g., France, Law No. 85-660 of July 3, I 985, official French text in journal
Officiel de la Repu.bliqu.e Fran,aise [J.O.J Quly 4, 1985), modifying and suplementing Law No.
57-298 on literary and artistic property of Mar. II, 1957, art. 6.5, J.O. (Mar. 14, 1957),
English translation reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD,
(suspending moral rights claims by joint authors of audiovisual works until establishment of
the definitive version); Champaud v. Editions legislatives et administratives, Cour de cassation, first civil chamber, December 16, 1986, 133 REVUE INTERNATIONALE ou DROJT o'AUTEUR
[RIDA] 183 ( 1987) (recognizing the right of the publisher of collective work to edit and alter
individual contributions to fit overall design of collective work).

